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Sacrificing Settlement Agreements in
the Name of Mediation
Confidentiality: The California




2Confidentiality is regarded as one of the primary benefits of mediation. For
parties who wish to avoid the public eye, mediation is often preferable to court.
However, when parties reach some form of a settlement agreement during media-
tion, and subsequently disagree as to the terms of that agreement, the parties may
find themselves in court. In court, the issue of whether the settlement agreement
is admissible arises. In Fair v. Bakhtiari,3 the California Supreme Court ad-
dressed the question of whether an arbitration provision listed in a settlement
agreement renders the agreement admissible under the California Evidence Code.4
The court emphasized the importance of maintaining mediation confidentiality
and recognized the value of "working documents" produced during mediation
sessions.5 However, by holding that an arbitration clause cannot render a settle-
ment agreement admissible, the court sacrificed the enforceability of such agree-
ments for the sake of mediation confidentiality. 6 The court's narrow holding does
not provide clear guidance as to how parties can draft settlement agreements that
are "enforceable," and, thus, admissible in a subsequent legal proceeding. Thus,
the Fair court has done future parties a disservice by providing a narrow and in-
complete holding regarding the admissibility of settlement agreements in Califor-
nia.
1H. FACTS AND HOLDING
Plaintiff R. Thomas Fair sued his former business partner, Karl E. Bakhtiari,
and his former wife, Maryanne E. Fair, as well as several business entities ("the
1. 147 P.3d 653 (Cal. 2006).
2. See Foxgate Homeowners' Ass'n. v. Bramalea Cal., Inc., 25 P.3d 1117, 1126 (Cal. 2001).
3. 147 P.3d 653 (Cal. 2006).
4. Id. at 654-57.
5. Id. at 656, 659.
6. See id. at 660.
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Stonesfair defendants"). Plaintiff alleged that the defendants "had wrongfully
excluded him from real estate syndications, denied him compensation, misappro-
priated profits, and engaged in other financial misconduct." 8 Plaintiff also ac-
cused Bakhtiari of physically assaulting him on several occasions. 9 In response to
Plaintiff's allegations, Bakhtiari, Ms. Fair, and the Stonesfair defendants answered
separately.' 0 The parties mediated their disputes during a two-day period. 11 At
the conclusion of the mediation, Plaintiffs counsel drafted a handwritten memo-
randum which prescribed settlement terms.12 The list of settlement terms included
the following provision: "Any and all disputes subject to JAMS [Judicial Arbitra-
tion and Mediation Services] arbitration rules."'13 The parties and the mediator
signed the memorandum, which was dated March 21, 2002.14
After signing the memorandum, the parties informed the court that the case
had settled in mediation by filing case management reports.' 5 On April 4, 2002,
counsel for the Stonesfair defendants circulated a settlement and release agree-
ment, "confirming the parties' intent to settle all their disputes 'as of and effective
March 21, 2002. ' ' 16 Counsel for the Stonesfair defendants learned a few days
before the case management conference that Plaintiff believed the parties' agree-
ment for the transfer of his assets did not apply to certain business interests.' 7 The
attorneys also discussed unresolved tax issues at this time.' 8 At the case manage-
ment conference, Bakhtiari's attorney requested a continuance. 19 He told the





12. Id. The memorandum was titled "Settlement Terms" and included the following provisions:
1. Cash payment of $5.4 MM to T. Fair w/in 60 days.
2. Payment treated as purchase of all T. Fair's stock & interests (as capital gain to Fair)[.]
3. [Defendants] will not look to Fair for reimbursement or indemnification of any phantom in-
come paid by them to date.
4. This provision relates solely to Fair's right to indemnity and does not preclude other rights of
the parties. Fair will be indemnified as a former officer, director & employee by SFC/SMC/SC
[the Stonesfair defendants], according to applicable law, against all 3rd party claims, including
LPs [limited partners] or IRS, arising from the operation of SFC/SMC. Fair will not make any
adverse contacts with IRS [or] LPs re: SFC/SMC, at risk of loss of indemnity and will not sug-
gest, foment or encourage litigation by LPs or any individual against defendants, at risk of loss of
indemnity.
5. Maryann Fair disclaims any community prop[erty] interest in settlement proceeds.
6. Parties will sign mutual releases and dismiss with prejudice all claims. Ain't of settlement will
be confidential with appropriate exceptions.
7. All sides bear their own attorneys fees and costs, including experts.
8. If Fair needs to restructure cash payments for tax purposes, defendants will cooperate (at no
additional cost to defendants).
9. Any and all disputes subject to JAMS [Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services] arbitration
rules.
Id. at 655 n.2.
13. Id.
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court, "We've reached a settlement agreement. We are now in the process of
exchanging settlement agreements. And there are some complicated taxation
matters involved. 20 The trial court granted the continuance. 2'
Although the continuance was granted, the parties did not finalize their set-
22tlement. On June 6, 2002, one of the attorneys for the Stonesfair defendants
filed a case management document informing the court that the parties were ulti-
mately unable to reach an agreement regarding the scope and subject matter of the
proposed settlement terms. He suggested that the case go to trial.2 In response,
Plaintiff's counsel demanded arbitration under the terms of the settlement memo-
randum.2 5 Defendants' counsel rejected the demand, and posited that the parties
26had not entered into an enforceable agreement. Defendants' counsel claimed the
settlement memorandum was inadmissible under section 1119(b) of the California
Evidence Code, which protects the confidentiality of writings "prepared for the
purpose of, in the course of, or pursuant to, a mediation. 27 Indeed, under section
1119(b), documents prepared for purposes of mediation are generally inadmissible
in civil proceedings.
28
Plaintiff moved to compel arbitration, asserting that the parties agreed to be
bound when they signed the March 21 memorandum, and, therefore, any disputes
over the meaning or extent of their agreement were subject to arbitration. 29 Plain-
tiff argued that the March 21 memorandum was admissible because the presence
of the arbitration provision made the parties' agreement "enforceable" under sec-
tion 1123(b) of the California Evidence Code. Section 1123(b) provides an
exception to section 11 19(b)'s general rule that mediation documents are inad-
missible in civil proceedings. 3 1  Under section 1123(b), a signed settlement
agreement reached through mediation is not inadmissible, if it "provides that it is
enforceable or binding or words to that effect.",32 Defendants opposed Plaintiffs
motion to compel arbitration. 33 Defendants objected to the admission of the set-
tlement memorandum and also to descriptions of the mediation discussions, which
were offered by Plaintiff s counsel.34
The trial court found that the reqvuirements of section 1123(b) were not met,
and thus excluded the memorandum. 5 Due to the inadmissibility of the memo-
randum, the court concluded that there was an "insufficient demonstration of an
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 656.
23. Id. (quotation omitted). Said attorney for the Stonesfair defendants substituted as counsel for all
defendants at this time. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. The settlement terms listed in the memorandum provided, "Any and all disputes subject to
JAMS [Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services] arbitration rules." Id. at 655.
26. Id. at 656.
27. Id. (citing CAL. EVID., CODE § 1119(b) (West 1997)).
28. Id. at 654 (emphasis added); see also CAL. EVID. CODE § 1119(b).
29. Id. at 656. Plaintiff noted that Defendants' counsel had told the court the case had settled. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 654; see also CAL. EVID. CODE § 1123(b) (West 1997).
32. Id. (emphasis added) (citing CAL. EvID., CODE § 1119(b)).
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arbitration agreement. 36  Thus, the court denied Plaintiffs motion to compel
arbitration.
The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the memorandum included
"words to that effect" as provided in section 1123(b), and therefore, the memoran-
dum was admissible under said section. 37 The court found that the memorandum
manifested a valid arbitration agreement. 38 The California Supreme Court granted
Defendants' petition for review.
39
In reversing the Court of Appeal's decision, the California Supreme Court
held that when an arbitration clause listed in a settlement agreement does not evi-
dence the parties' intent to be bound, the arbitration clause does not render the
agreement admissible under section 1 123(b).' °
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Statutory Interpretation
The California Supreme Court has declared that, when engaged in statutory
interpretation, it is necessary to ascertain the Legislature's intent.4 1 First, courts
look to the words themselves, because legislative intent is generally indicated by
42the statutory language. The words should be given their ordinary and usual
meaning and should be construed in their statutory context.43 Thus, judicial con-
struction that renders part of the statute "meaningless or inoperative" is generally
precluded. 44 Related statutes are interpreted so as to harmonize their requirements
and avoid anomaly.45
B. Mediation in California
The California Legislature recognizes the importance of utilizing alternative
dispute resolution methods.46 Since 1986, implementing such methods has been a
strong legislative policy in California. 47 The Legislature has stated that, in appro-
priate cases, mediation provides a simplified and economical procedure for resolv-
48ing disputes. The process is prompt and gives parties the opportunity to obtain
fair results.49 Furthermore, mediating parties participate directly in the resolution
36. Id.
37. Id. The Court of Appeal stated that the arbitration clause in the parties' list of settlement terms
satisfied section 1123(b), because the clause could only reflect an intent that the document would be
"enforceable or binding." Id. at 658.
38. Id. at 656.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 660.




45. Coachella Valley Mosquito & Vector Control Dist. v. Cal. Pub. Employment Relations Rd., 112
P.3d 623, 634 (Cal. 2005).
46. Rojas v. Superior Court, 93 P.3d 260, 264-65 (Cal. 2004).
47. Id.
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of their disputes. 50 Mediation also benefits the judicial system by reducing the
backlog in the courts. 51 Therefore, it is in the public interest for courts to promote
and use mediation programs.
52
The California Legislature has encouraged mediation by enacting "mediation
confidentiality provisions. 53 In Foxgate Homeowners' Association v. Bramalea
California, Inc.,54 the California Supreme Court analyzed such a provision: sec-
tion 1119 of the California Evidence Code. 55  Section 1119(c) provides: "All
communications, negotiations, or settlement discussions by and between partici-
pants in the course of a mediation . . .shall remain confidential. 56 The court
declared that the statute is clear, that it prohibits any person, both mediator and
participants, from revealing any written or oral communication made during med-
iation. 57 The court also discussed the legislative intent underlying the mediation
confidentiality provisions of the California Evidence Code.58 Specifically, the
purpose of confidentiality provisions is to promote a candid exchange regarding
past events.59 This exchange is only possible if participants know that what is said
during the mediation will not be used against them in later adjudicatory
processes.6° In summary, the court stated that confidentiality is essential to effec-
tive mediation. 61 To encourage mediation by ensuring confidentiality, section
1119 bars disclosure of communications made during mediation absent an express
62
statutory exception.
Exceptions to mediation confidentiality do, however, exist. For example, sec-
tion 1123(b) of the California Evidence Code provides that a written settlement
agreement prepared in the course of a mediation is not inadmissible if the agree-
ment is signed and the agreement provides that it is "enforceable or binding or
words to that effect., 63 Thus, section 1123(b) is an exception to the confidentiali-
ty rule expressed in section 1119. Due to the requirement that the agreement must
provide that "it is enforceable or binding or words to that effect[,]" section
1123(b) is a limited provision. A written list of terms on which the parties have





53. Rojas, 93 P.3d at 265 (citing Foxgate Homeowners' Ass'n. v. Bramalea Cal., Inc., 25 P.3d 1117,
1126 (2001)).
54. 25 P.3d 1117 (2001).
55. Id. at 1125-26.
56. ld. at 1124.
57. Id. at 1125. Because the language of section 1119 is unambiguous, judicial construction of the
statute is not permitted unless the statute cannot be applied according to its terms or doing so would
lead to absurd results. Id. at 1126.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. (citing Nat'l. Conference of Comm'rs. on Unif. State Laws, Unif. Mediation Act (May 2001)
§ 2).
61. Id. at 1126.
62. Id.
63. CAL. EvID. CODE § 1123(b) (West 1997).
64. See Opening Brief on the Merits for Defendants and Respondents at 14-15, Fair v. Bakhtiari, 147
P.3d 653 (2006) (No. 5129220).
No. 2]
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C. Enforceability of Settlement Agreements and Arbitration Clauses
Mediators strive to produce written terms by the end of the mediation ses-
sion. 65 However, the parties may not intend such terms to be enforceable or bind-
ing.66 If an agreement is intended to be enforceable or binding, then the standard
rules of contract interpretation govern the interpretation of the settlement agree-
ment.67 A contract is enforceable and binding when the parties to the contract had
the capacity to consent and agreed on the material terms regarding the exchange
of consideration. A party's intent to contract is judged from an objective stan-
dard, by looking at the party's outward manifestations of intent. 9
In California, a written arbitration agreement is "valid, enforceable, and irre-
vocable.",70 Furthermore, public policy favors arbitration; thus, a party seeking an
order compelling arbitration must simply establish that an agreement to arbitrate
the controversy has been made.71
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Fair v. Bakhtiari,72 the California Supreme Court analyzed whether a set-
tlement agreement, which contained an arbitration clause, was admissible upon a
motion to compel arbitration.73 Initially, the court asserted that the mediation
confidentiality provisions of the California Evidence Code were enacted to en-
courage mediation.74 The confidentiality provisions allow parties to engage in
candid discussions without fear that disclosures might be used against them in
later proceedings. 75 According to the court, the statutory scheme embodied in the
Evidence Code "unqualifiedly bars disclosure of communications made during
mediation absent an express statutory exception. ' 76
First, the California Supreme Court interpreted section 1123(b) of the Cali-
fornia Evidence Code.77 The court analyzed section 1123(b) as follows: section
1123(b), which pertains to written settlements, is an exception to the general bar
against disclosures of communications made during mediation. 78 This section
65. JUDGE H. WARREN KNIGHT ET AL., CAL. PRACTICE GUIDE: ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
(2003).
66. MARK D. BENNETT & MICHELE S.D. HERMAN, THE ART OF MEDIATION 68 (1996).
67. Vaillette v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 18 Cal. App. 4th 680, 686 (1993).
68. See generally CAL. CIv. CODE § 1550 (West 1872).
69. King v. Stanley, 32 Cal. 2d 584, 591 (1948).
70. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281 (West 1961).
71. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.2 (West 1978); see also Coast Plaza Doctors Hosp. v. Blue
Cross of Cal., 83 Cal. App. 4th 677, 687 (2000).
72. Fair v. Bakhtiari, 147 P.3d 653 (2006).
73. Id. at 654-55.
74. Id. at 656.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id at 656-58.
78. Id. Section 1123(b) provides,
A written settlement agreement prepared in the course of, or pursuant to, a mediation, is not made
inadmissible, or protected from disclosure ... if the agreement is signed by the settling parties
and ... [T]he agreement provides that it is enforceable or binding or words to that effect.
Id. at 657 n. 5 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 2007
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provides that a written settlement agreement is not protected from disclosure if the
parties sign the agreement and the agreement provides that it is enforceable or
binding or words to that effect.79 To begin its discussion, the court provided
background information regarding section 1123(b).80 The California Law Revi-
sion Commission issued a Recommendation on Mediation Confidentiality.8" The
Commission recommended statutory mediation reforms to clarify the application
of mediation confidentiality to settlements. 82 The court stated that section 1123(b)
is indeed one of the reforms recommended by the Commission. 83 The Commis-
sion stated that the reforms should "enhance the effectiveness of mediation in
promoting durable settlements." 84 The court deemed the Commission's official
comments as expressions of the Legislature's intent.
85
The court noted that mediation confidentiality and the disclosure of settle-
ment agreements are treated separately in the California Evidence Code. 8 6 Section
1119 states the general rule that writings prepared for mediation are inadmissible,
and section 1123 states the exceptions applicable to written settlement agree-
87 88ments. Section 1123 is the provision at issue in the instant case. Specifically,
section 1123(b) provides that a written settlement agreement is not made inad-
missible if the agreement is signed by the settling parties, and "the agreement
provides that it is enforceable or binding or words to that effect." 89 The court
cited the Commission's comments regarding section 1123, which provided that
"[tihe proposed section on settlements would explicitly make an executed written
settlement agreement admissible if it provides that it is 'enforceable' or 'binding'
or words to that effect."
90
The California Supreme Court then addressed the decision reached by the
Court of Appeal. 9' According to the Supreme Court, the appellate court was cor-
rect in its reasoning that the "words to that effect" clause of 1123(b) reflects the
Legislature's interest in parties using terms that unambiguously signify their intent
92to be bound. However, the Supreme Court found that the appellate court erred
"by concluding that the inclusion of an arbitration clause in the parties' list of
settlement terms satisfied section 1123(b). 93
The Supreme Court interreted the phrase "words to that effect" more nar-
.94
rowly than the appellate court. The Supreme Court stated that its guide for statu-
tory interpretation is the ordinary meaning of the words themselves, the statute's
79. Id. at 657-58.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 658.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 657
85. Id.
86. Id. at 657.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 654-656.
89. Id. at 657 n.5.
90. Id.
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context, and legislative intent.95 According to the Supreme Court, the Legisla-
ture's goal was to provide parties with the opportunity to express their intent to be
bound in their own words, rather than in a legalistic formulation. 96 The Supreme
Court determined that to preserve the confidentiality required in the mediation
process, a writing must explicitly communicate the parties' agreement to be bound
by the document they sign in order to satisfy the phrase "words to that effect"
contained in section 1123(b). 97 The court reasoned that a "working document may
include an arbitration provision, without reflecting an actual agreement to be
bound."98
Next, the court disposed of Plaintiff Fair's argument that Defendants' con-
duct-circulating a formal agreement-proves that an enforceable settlement was
intended.99 The court found that it is inappropriate to "examine extrinsic evidence
to resolve competing claims over the parties' intent."' ° Rather, the court held that
intent must be evident from the written agreement itself.10 1 The court also dis-
missed Plaintiffs argument that the arbitration clause is severable from the set-
tlement agreement, and is independently enforceable. 0 2 The court stated that a
settlement agreement must be admissible before the issues of severability and
enforceability can be reached. 10 3 The court interpreted section 1123(b) as provid-
ing parties with the opportunity to create a working document without fear that
such document could later be used against them.' ° 4 In the instant case, the court
determined that the settlement agreement was a "work in progress" and was not
admissible; thus, enforceability was not an issue.'
05
Finally, the court reiterated that "to satisfy section 1123(b), a settlement
agreement must include a statement that [the agreement] is 'enforceable' or 'bind-
ing,' or a declaration in other terms [that has] the same meaning."' °6 The court
concluded that arbitration clauses and other enforcement provisions typically ne-
gotiated in settlement discussions do not qualify an agreement for admission un-
der section 1123(b). 10 7 The California Supreme Court held that the arbitration
clause in the list of settlement terms drafted by the parties did not evidence an
intent to be bound by such terms and, therefore, reversed the Court of Appeal's
order to compel arbitration.1°8
95. Id. (citing Hassan v. Mercy American River Hospital, 74 P.3d 726 (Cal. 2003); Rojas v. Superior
Court, 93 P.3d 260 (Cal. 2004)).
96. Id.


















As the California Legislature has recognized, promoting mediation is in the
public's interest.' °9 Assurance of confidentiality serves to facilitate mediation." 0
Parties are more likely to be honest about their positions and underlying interests
if disclosures made during the mediation session remain confidential, than if such
information can be used against either party in a later legal proceeding. Fair v.
Bahktiari furthers the policy of maintaining mediation confidentiality. In Fair,
the California Supreme Court recognized the usefulness of "working documents"
produced during mediation sessions." 2 If each tentative agreement reached dur-
ing a mediation session were subject to later disclosure, the parties would likely
accomplish little in their discussions. Instead, if courts view a tentative "working
document" as what the term implies-a work in progress-parties will be freer to
brainstorm, record different ideas, and formulate an array of possible solutions.
In the instant decision, certain facts support interpreting the settlement memo-
randum as a binding agreement, while other facts support interpreting the memo-
randum as a working document. Facts in favor of finding a binding agreement
include the arbitration provision itself, which clearly provides, "Any and all dis-
putes subject to JAMS arbitration rules."'"13 This statement suggests that from the
time of the mediation forward, any disputes would be arbitrated. Furthermore, the
mediator and the parties signed the memorandum. 4 One's signature on a docu-
ment is generally seen as a commitment to what is expressed therein. However,
the memorandum was handwritten, which suggests informality. Such informality
points in favor of finding a "working document." Additionally, the memorandum
was drafted at the end of the second day of a two-day mediation period, which
suggests that the parties' goal may have simply been to put their thoughts on paper
before the session ended." 5 The California Supreme Court did not address the
fact that the memorandum was signed, nor the fact that it was handwritten. If the
court had addressed these facts, future parties would have benefited from better
guidance regarding how to draft settlement agreements.
The California Supreme Court focused on whether the arbitration provision
satisfies the language in section 1123(b): "words to that effect."" 6 The court
determined that the arbitration clause does not qualify the entire agreement for
admission under section 1123(b)."17 Thus, the Fair decision provides future me-
diating parties with some guidance as to how they should draft settlement agree-
ments if they intend them to be enforceable and, thus, admissible. Mediating par-
ties in the state of California are now on notice that arbitration clauses negotiated
in settlement discussions do not render a settlement agreement admissible under
109. Rojas v. Superior Court, 93 P.3d 260, 265 (Cal. 2003) (citing CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 1775(c)
(West 2007)).
110. Id. (citing Foxgate Homeowners' Ass'n. v. Bramalea Cal., Inc., 25 P.3d 1117 (Cal. 2001)).
111. 147 P.3d 653 (Cal. 2006).
112. Id. at 659.
113. Id. at 655.
114. Id. at 654-55.
115. See id. at 655.
116. Id. at 657-60.
117. Id. at 660.
No. 21
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section 1123(b).1 8 As a result of this decision, mediating parties who intend to
make their settlement agreements binding and enforceable are advised to explicit-
ly express that intent in their agreements. Parties need to include a provision stat-
ing that the entire agreement is "enforceable or binding or words to that effect"
rather than relying on an arbitration provision as evidence of such intent.
Problematically, the Fair court does not provide adequate guidance regarding
how parties should draft their settlement agreements in order to satisfy section
1123(b). The court offers the narrow holding that an arbitration provision does
not constitute "words to that effect" under section 1123(b)." 9 The court requires
clear evidence of an intent to be bound. 20 However, the court does not specify
what language, other than the provided terms "enforceable" or "binding," will
satisfy section 1123(b).' 2' Thus, future parties are left without knowing what
alternative terms California courts will find satisfactory under section 1123(b).
Parties who do intend their agreements to be "enforceable" or "binding" risk a
judicial finding to the contrary, unless the parties include those exact terms. Due
to the court's narrow holding, the "words to that effect" clause is rendered mea-
ningless. Reasonable parties will not take the aforesaid risk and, thus, will simply
use the provided terms: "enforceable" or "binding." Parties who are unaware of
the Fair decision, and instead rely on section 1123(b) for guidance, may be disad-
vantaged if they find themselves litigating the enforceability and admissibility of a
settlement agreement which does not contain these exact terms. The court miss-
tepped in its statutory interpretation by effectively rendering the "words to that
effect" clause meaningless.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Fair v. Bakhtiari, the California Supreme Court underlined the importance
of mediation confidentiality.' 22 The court recognized the importance of "working
documents" and the flexibility required for a successful mediation session. 123 The
court avoided instituting a policy where terms reached during a mediation session
could be used against a party in a later legal proceeding, unless the terms are
clearly enforceable.
After Fair, parties may not rely on arbitration provisions contained in settle-
ment agreements as evidence of their intent to be bound by the agreement. In-
stead, parties must express their intent to be bound in a separate provision, a pro-
vision clearly applicable to the entire agreement. If parties abide by this rule, their
settlement agreement will likely be admissible in a subsequent legal proceeding
regarding the agreement.
Unfortunately, the Fair court does not provide adequate guidance to future
parties who seek to satisfy section 1123(b). The Fair court stated that the Legisla-
ture's goal was to allow parties to express their intent to be bound in their own
118. Id. at 659-60.
119. Id. at 658.
120. Id. at 658-59.
121. Id. at 660.
122. Id. at 656, 658.
123. Id. at 658.
[Vol. 2007
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words, rather than by using a legalistic formulation. 124 However, the court left
unanswered the question of what terms, other than "enforceable" or "binding,"
California courts will likely accept as satisfactory under section 1123(b). 125 Thus,
parties are required to draft their settlement agreements using a legalistic formula-
tion. Parties who do not utilize the provided terms have little security that a Cali-
fornia court will find their settlement agreement admissible under section 1123(b).
The harsh consequence of the court's narrow holding is to render the "words to
that effect" clause of section 1123(b) meaningless. This result is contrary to the
California rules of statutory interpretation. Indeed, judicial construction that rend-
ers part of a statute meaningless is generally precluded. The California Supreme
Court's narrow holding will most likely lead to more confusion and litigation
regarding what terms provide sufficient evidence that the parties intended a set-
tlement agreement to be enforceable and, thus, admissible.
LAURA J. BETTENHAUSEN
124. Id.
125. See id. at 657-58, 660.
No. 2]
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